



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

In his discussion of the lost Epitome of Livy, Professor Sanders does himself greater justice. He criticizes Reinhold's and Drescher's recent dissertations and continues and defends his thesis of 1897, in which he showed that this abridgment was composed as early as Tiberius's reign. The correct attribution of later statements to this vanished condensation of Livy is a peculiarly delicate task, as has been well pointed out by Schwartz apropos of Dio Cassius. Professor Sanders has collected numerous resemblances of statement in late historians, and his general conclusions agree with those of earlier investigators and are certainly sound; but the aptness of several of his parallelisms must remain a matter of opinion. The collection has however a permanent value for all students of Roman historical tradition. From Pliny's citation of *Livius filius* as a source for a portion of book 5, in which we do find a fragment of the Epitome, and from one or two other indications, Professor Sanders ventures to guess that the historian's son was his abridger. What a pity, since this study was not already published when the discovery of the Oxyrhynchus fragment was heralded, that the volume was not held and the essay worked over in the light which the new abstract throws upon the whole subject, as just pointed out by Professors Moore of Harvard and Kornemann of Tübingen!

CHARLES UPSON CLARK.

Seven Roman Statesmen of the Later Republic. By CHARLES W. C. OMAN, M.A. (London: Edward Arnold; New York: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1902. Pp. viii, 348.)

THE seven statesmen are the two Gracchi, Sulla, Crassus, the younger Cato, Pompey, and Cæsar. Their lives, as Mr. Oman points out (p. 11), "completely cover the last century of Rome's *ancien régime*"; or, more precisely, they cover the course of the Roman revolution. The *ancien régime* received a fatal shock when Tiberius Gracchus appealed to the direct expression of the popular will without regard to the checks and balances of the constitution. In reality he thus forced the issue of personal versus constitutional government; and this was not finally settled until Augustus found a *modus vivendi* for both, that the lion and the lamb might lie down together, with the lamb, as it proved, ultimately inside. In the nature of the issue we have one reason why the story of the hundred years required for its settlement may well be told in a series of biographical studies. Each of Mr. Oman's seven statesmen, with the exception of Cato, whose career after all might have been quite as well left to incidental treatment as that of Marius or of Cicero, represented the monarchical principle, each more distinctly than his predecessor. Thus the true meaning of the whole process, as Mr. Oman indicates in his preface, may be brought out by concentrating attention upon the personal element.

Although the cardinal facts of the story are common property and allow of no radically new explanation, yet they are invested with new

interest by Mr. Oman's literary skill, his graphic and often colloquial style, his genial and pungent wit—as of the Oxford common-room, his thoroughly individual appreciation of each of the leading figures, and his presentation of the whole movement in modern and realistic terms. The seven are for him, as for Mommsen, not “Plutarch's men”, but actual politicians, which they become when studied by one who knows more about history and politics than Plutarch did. M. Livius Drusus was a Tory-Democrat (p. 104). Crassus reminds him of “that wonderful old Whig, the Duke of Newcastle” (p. 191). He clinches the proof that it was not protracted warfare but foreign competition that ruined Italian agriculture by observing that “otherwise the Roman farmer, like the British farmer in the golden days of the struggle with Napoleon, might have prayed for ‘a bloody war and a wet harvest,’ as the things most likely to send up wheat to 120 s. the quarter” (p. 17). The gratitude of the proletariat, when Caius Gracchus put through his bill for the sale of the tithe-corn at half the market-price, reminds him “of the Portuguese army when it saluted its commander with the shout, ‘Long live Marshal Beresford, who takes care of our bellies’” (p. 59). “The Aedui and the Remi”, he observes, “stood to Cæsar in Gaul much as the Nawabs of Oude and the Carnatic stood to the British in India” (p. 316), while the spade-work of Cæsar's and Pompey's soldiers in front of Dyrrhachium finds its like nowhere except in the “interminable entrenchments around Richmond and Petersburg” in 1864-1865 (p. 329).

There are three possible verdicts, each of which found expression in antiquity, in the case of the Government *vs.* Tiberius Gracchus. Either his programme and his methods were equally justifiable, or his aims were right but his means wrong, or both aims and means alike are to be condemned. Mr. Oman finds against him on both counts and for convincing reasons. The agrarian law, for the sake of which he had no “right to pull down the constitution about the ears of the people” (p. 49), was a perfectly futile attempt to suspend—on what we should call populist principles—the operation of economic causes. Not the greed of the rich, but cheap grain from abroad, was ruining the small farmer. The only remedy, says Mr. Oman, was protection, and this could not be had because “the city mob would never vote for the dear loaf” (p. 24).

In reviewing the ten years that passed between the death of Tiberius and the tribunate of Caius Gracchus, Mr. Oman neglects to explain how it happened that the agrarian law was allowed to stand and why its execution was subsequently checked. In other words, he ignores the intervention of the group of moderates headed by Scipio Æmilianus, whose attitude toward the question of reform is most instructive and, in a very true sense, prophetic. Scipio saw clearly the rocks upon which the good ship Constitution was drifting, but believed that it was impossible to escape them. “Either we are lost”, he said, “or we are lost.” This is the only instance in which Mr. Oman has allowed him-

self to ignore a significant and impressive personality, without which the story of the revolution is incomplete.

It is at least open to question whether Mr. Oman is correct in the assumption that Caius Gracchus reënacted his brother's agrarian law only because it looked well in the democratic programme. It looks more like the chief end of his legislation, the goal to be gained at the price of the corn dole for the proletariat, the courts and the taxes of Asia for the capitalists, and monarchical power for the reigning demagogue. In the permanent influence of the equestrian order, as constituted by Caius and controlled by a syndicate of big capitalists—what Mr. Lawson would call a "System", Mr. Oman recognizes a conspicuous instance of the evil that men do living after them; but he fails to note that it was these capitalists who compelled the declaration of war against Jugurtha and steadily backed Marius, one of their own class, until his democratic ally Saturninus began to attack vested interests. Then they compelled Marius to abandon Saturninus to their vengeance. It was the young and active members of the equestrian order—and not, strictly speaking, an "Optimate mob" (p. 103)—who put Saturninus to death. Capital had dropped the democrats when they became anarchists, just as it recoiled in horror when Crassus and Cæsar put up Catiline to attack society that they might be its saviors. When Mr. Oman mentions the young equites who on December 5, 63 B. C., waited for Cæsar sword in hand (p. 183), he might have reminded us that they were minded to do to Cæsar as their grandsires had done to Saturninus.

Another crisis that remains more or less of a riddle in Mr. Oman's book is the one that began in the year 88 B. C. In agreement with Mommsen he represents the Sulpician revolution and the civil war between Marius and Sulla as hinging solely on "mere personal rivalry for a military command" (p. 113). It has, however, been conclusively shown by Nitzsch that it was again the capitalists—well-nigh ruined in the financial panic due to the Social War, the successes of Mithridates, and the massacre of their agents in Asia Minor, exasperated by the revival of the old law against interest, and resolved not to allow the Senate to get possession of the fat province of Asia—who forced through the Sulpician laws and secured the appointment of Marius to the command of the army of the east, with which the Senate had legally vested Sulla. The war between Sulla and the Marians was a war between the Senate and the "System". When Sulla finally became master and monarch of Rome, sixteen hundred financiers were sent to join a thousand of their confrères who had fallen in the course of the war, and their property was confiscated. That was the end of the "System" as a political factor of dangerous magnitude.

Mr. Oman's admirable portraits of Sulla and Crassus do not vary from the prevailing conceptions of these men sufficiently to arouse dissent; but it is otherwise with his treatment of Cato, Pompey, and Cæsar. Of them he writes (p. 236): "It is hardly necessary to say

that Mommsen's estimate of Pompey is no more to be taken seriously than his estimates of Cicero, or Cato, or Cæsar. It is as misleading to treat him as a mere drill-sergeant, as to call Cicero a 'fluent Consular', or Cato a 'mere Don Quixote,' or Cæsar a beneficent and unselfish saviour of society." Apart from the question whether any judgment of the "master of those who know" Roman history is not to be taken seriously even when it must be reversed on appeal, it hardly seems to the present writer that Mr. Oman has succeeded in rehabilitating Cato's reputation for normal common-sense or that he has devoted sufficient attention to Cicero to make clear the issue between himself and the great scholar from whom he has learned so much. For him, too, Cicero is "the unfortunate orator" (p. 228), led astray at a critical moment by his "idiotic vanity" (p. 189). As for Pompey, Mommsen undoubtedly misunderstood him, but it is a question whether Mr. Oman, in his reaction from Mommsen's view, has not assumed an attitude so erect as to have endangered his own equilibrium. We may admit that Pompey did not ineffectually seek the crown, without having to regard him as thoroughly loyal to the republican constitution. One would never get the impression from Mr. Oman's book that it was he, more than any other man, who threw the republican machine out of gear. He was not content with the honor of being the "first citizen in the Republic" (p. 288); he wanted chief power as well, but was unwilling to say so. It must come to him, Pompeius Magnus, as a tribute to his greatness. For this reason he affected indifference to the Gabinian law, not because (p. 250) he "doubted his own capacity" to clear the sea of pirates. For this reason he disbanded his army on his return from the east, not because (p. 261) he was a model of "civic virtue". For this reason he looked on at the anarchy of 54-53 B. C.—which Mr. Oman regards as very "curious" (p. 276)—not because he did not know what ought to be done, but because he meant to compel the government to throw itself into his arms, as it finally had to do. He accordingly did choose to play the rôle of savior of society, for which Mr. Oman thinks he had no inclination (p. 288). There is damaging evidence against the purity of Pompey's intentions in the confidential correspondence of Cicero, and, although the *Bellum Civile* was a campaign document, there is no good reason to doubt Cæsar's statement that on January 1, 49 B. C., when his own march on Rome was imminent, the Pompeians threatened to join hands with him and wreak united vengeance on the recalcitrant Senate. The Senate realized fully that it had only the choice of masters. Pompey, we repeat, did not wish to be king; but he conceived of himself as entitled to be the successor of Sulla as an extra-constitutional executive, the guardian of the empire and its earthly providence. Thus Pompey and not Cæsar was the true forerunner of Augustus.

Mr. Oman's portrait of the great Julius is more convincing. He does not blink the seamy side of Cæsar's career. The aristocratic young demagogue, with his extraordinary capacity for self-advertisement and

for "getting through money—especially other people's money" (p. 302), who led gangs of thugs to the polls and was at the same time "the inevitable co-respondent in every fashionable divorce" (p. 301), gets his due on all these counts; nor is it admitted that he can be truthfully represented even in his later years "as a staid and divine figure replete with schemes for the benefit of humanity" (p. 292). He remains "the great adventurer" (p. 284). "The monarch of the world was at bottom the same man as the clever young scamp whose epigrams and adulteries had scandalised Rome thirty years back" (p. 292). Yet nowhere has his consummate mastery of military, as of political, strategy and tactics been more effectively presented and analyzed than by the accomplished historian of the art of war in this the most interesting chapter of his excursion into Roman history. Nothing could be better than his explanation of the unparalleled variety of Cæsar's campaigns by the fact that the conqueror of Gaul "was essentially an amateur of genius, who had taken to war late in life, and not a soldier steeped from his youth upwards in the study of the drill-book and the manœuvres of the barrack yard" (p. 322); and with this may be coupled the reminder that "his final object was not so much the conquest of Gaul, as the building up for himself of an unrivalled military reputation and a devoted army" (p. 321). In short, the explanation of his whole career is to be found in "enlightened ambition and the love of doing work well, if it has to be done at all" (p. 291). Mr. Oman gives us this very realistic Cæsar in express antithesis throughout to the ideal Cæsar constructed by Mommsen, whose *Römische Geschichte* was an apotheosis of the great revolutionist, conceived in the heyday of youth by a son of the German revolutionary movement, but largely rejected by the sober second thoughts of a less turbulent age. It would have been only fair to state that, in declining to write his fourth volume, Mommsen tacitly admitted his youthful error; and if Mr. Oman had bethought himself of Mommsen's own reconstruction of the Augustan Principate, as based on the "dyarchy" of Senate and Princeps, he would hardly have left us with the conclusion that Cæsar had solved the problem of sovereignty by establishing an autocracy (p. 339). Cæsar's solution was, as he says, logical, but it was certainly not practical nor definitive.

On page 189 the note should refer to the fourteenth and not the thirteenth letter in the first book of Cicero's correspondence with Atticus, and on page 215 the reference is to the eighth and not the third paragraph of the letter there cited. On pages 258 and 273 we have "negligible", on page 218 "negligeable". The illustrations reproduce the Naples bust of Cæsar, the so-called Pompey, also in Naples, and three sets of historically significant coins. Since 1886, when Helbig published the authentic and very characteristic head of Pompey, now in Copenhagen, there has been really no excuse for continuing to serve up the Naples bust, which had previously been discredited by Bernoulli.

HENRY A. SILL.